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 Drug overdose deaths are rising at an alarming rate.1 In 2016 
alone, 63,632 people died from a drug overdose in the United States.2 
In 2017, drug overdose deaths grew to an estimated 72,000.3 And yet, 
these statistics just scratch the surface; the United States government 
does not track death rates for every drug.4 In March 2018, the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse declared the misuse of and addiction to 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; University of Missouri, B.A. Political Science and B.A. Political 
Communications, May 2016. 




4 Id. Opioids are the main driver of drug overdose deaths. Opioid Data 
Analysis and Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
(February 9, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html. Every day, 
more than 115 people in the United States die after overdosing on opioids. Id. 
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opioids a national crisis.5 The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention estimated that the total “economic burden” of prescription 
opioid abuse alone is $78.5 billion a year, which includes the cost of 
healthcare, lost productivity, addiction treatment and criminal justice 
involvement. 6 
 On May 10, 2017, then United States Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions sent a memorandum to all federal prosecutors notifying them 
of a change in Department of Justice charging and sentencing policy.7 
He instructed prosecutors to charge and pursue the most serious, 
readily provable offense, which, by his definition, “are those that carry 
the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory 
minimum sentences.”8 With this memorandum came the 
understanding that President Donald Trump’s administration would be 
tough on crime and committed to ending the drug crisis.9 To further 
this goal, federal prosecutors began looking to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines for support—in particular, the “death results” 
sentencing enhancement.10 
 The “death results” sentencing enhancement is derived from the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.11 
The Act criminalizes manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or 
possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
                                                 
5 Emerging Trends and Alerts, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, (July 
2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis. 
The Midwestern region saw opioid overdoses increase 70 percent from July 2016 
through September 2017. Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Jeff Sessions, Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017) 
(Memorandum for all federal prosecutors) (on file with the Office of the Attorney 
General). 
8 Id. 
9 Stephen Collinson and Laura Jarrett, Trump Embraces Law and Order 
Agenda, CNN, (August 29, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/29/politics/trump-
law-order-jeff-sessions/index.html. 
10 Id. 
11 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
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controlled substance.12 The “death results” enhancement may be 
applied when the defendant commits a drug offense and “death or 
serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.”13 Should 
the Government prove the dealer’s drugs were the but-for cause of a 
drug user’s death, the dealer’s mandatory minimum sentence is twenty 
years in prison.14 This is a significant increase from the penalty for 
simple drug distribution.15 
 In United States v. Harden, the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
imposed the “death results” enhancement in a case involving a heroin 
overdose.16 The defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute 
heroin and was sentenced to life in prison.17 The defendant appealed 
his conviction and sentence to the Seventh Circuit, which heard, as a 
matter of first impression, arguments as to whether the “death results” 
enhancement requires the Government prove the user’s death was 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.18 The Seventh Circuit held 
the “death results” enhancement does not require the Government 
prove any mens rea element, including reasonable foreseeability.19 
Therefore, the “death results” enhancement shall be treated as a matter 
of strict liability.20 This holding has significant policy implications; 




15 The penalties for simple drug distribution vary based on the quantity and 
type of drug; however, sentences can reach as low as five years. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
841(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
16 893 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 18-6036, 2018 WL 
4509897 (Oct. 15, 2018). 
17 Id. at 445. 
18 Id. at 446. The court’s standard of review was de novo. Id.  
19 Id. at 454. The Seventh Circuit also held: (1) the evidence was sufficient to 
establish that heroin distributed by the defendant was the but-for cause of death; (2) 
the defendant had waived his challenge to a jury instruction regarding causation; (3) 
the exclusion of testimony about an alternative heroin source was proper; (4) the 
defendant was not entitled to a mistrial even though a photograph not admitted into 
evidence was given to the jury; and (5) the prosecutor’s alleged misstatements did 
not warrant new trial. Id. at 434. 
20 Id. at 448. 
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courts have expressed hope that drug distributers and manufacturers 
will think twice about dealing drugs that are dangerous to drug users 
because the dealer will be responsible for the user’s death.21 
 While the Seventh Circuit reached the right decision in Harden, 
federal courts are taking two very different approaches to handling two 
similar fact patterns. Courts require the Government prove 
foreseeability in drug conspiracy cases where a defendant is sentenced 
based on a co-conspirator’s conduct; however, the Government is not 
required to prove foreseeability when seeking the sentencing 
enhancement for a defendant charged with simple drug distribution.22 
This discrepancy is one of many, leading some district courts to 
express a desire for discretion—a way to “opt out” of the mandatory 
minimum sentence even if the “death results” enhancement applies.23 
Although the Government should not be required to prove an overdose 
death was reasonably foreseeable to a defendant to apply the “death 
results” sentencing enhancement, a district court should be able to 
depart from the mandatory minimum sentence when the sentence can 
be considered a miscarriage of justice. 
 This Comment has four parts. Part I analyzes how courts have 
historically interpreted the “death results” enhancement, including the 
decision to require but-for causation and beyond a reasonable doubt as 
the burden of proof. Part II considers how similar fact patterns result 
in drastically different sentences, warranting some judicial discretion. 
Part III dives deeper into how the Seventh Circuit reached its holding 
in Harden. Finally, in Part IV, I consider the implications of Harden: 
how recent cases have used Harden as precedent, why the Supreme 
Court should hear a case like Harden, and how the “death results” 




                                                 
21 United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 2016). 
22 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2013), rehearing en 
banc denied (Aug. 23, 2013). 
23 United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IS FAVORABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT 
 
 Case law regarding statutory interpretation of the “death results” 
enhancement overwhelmingly benefits the Government. The 
Government should not be required to prove a user’s death was 
reasonably foreseeable to a defendant in order for the court to impose 
the “death results” enhancement because the statutory provision’s 
plain language demonstrates Congress’s intent to require but-for 
cause, rather than proximate cause. Still, since courts consider the 
“death results” enhancement to be an element of the offense, the 
Government faces a higher burden in proving the “death results” 
enhancement than it would if treated as a sentencing factor. 
 
A.  The Government should not be required to prove foreseeability 
because the “death results” sentencing enhancement requires but-for 
causation rather than proximate causation. 
 
 The Controlled Substances Act, as originally enacted, “tied the 
penalties for drug offenses to both the type of drug and the quantity 
involved, with no provision for mandatory minimum sentences.”24 
This changed in 1986, when Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act, which redefined offense categories, increased the maximum 
penalties, and set minimum penalties for offenders.25 The Act also 
created the “death results” enhancement.26 With the enhancement, the 
default sentencing rules do not apply when “death or serious bodily 
injury results from the use of the distributed substance.”27 The 
defendant is instead sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall 
                                                 
24 Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 208 (2014). 
25 Id. The provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are often referred to as the “Len Bias 
laws” and are named after a popular college basketball star who died of a drug 
overdose in 1986. Congress enacted the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 under the 
theory that but for their purchase of drugs, the overdose victims would not have died. 
Katherine Daniels and Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and Prosecuting 
Heroin Overdose Cases, 41 CRIM. LAW. LAW BULLETIN 5 (2005). 
26 Burrage, 571 U.S. at 209. 
27 Id. 
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not be less than twenty years or more than life, a substantial fine, or 
both.28 
 Because the “death results” enhancement increases the minimum 
and maximum sentence, the elements of the enhancement have to be 
submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.29 The 
Supreme Court, in Burrage v. United States, considered what evidence 
the Government had to present in order to meet its burden.30 
Specifically, the Court assessed whether the Government met its 
burden when the evidence suggested the use of a drug, supplied by the 
defendant, contributed to, but was not the but-for cause of, the victim’s 
death.31 There the defendant distributed heroin to an individual who 
died of a drug overdose.32 The defendant was charged with unlawfully 
distributing heroin and that “death resulted from the use of that 
substance—thus subjecting [the defendant] to a 20-year mandatory 
minimum sentence” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).33 At trial, 
medical experts testified that the user may have died even if he did not 
inject the heroin.34 The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
arguing the Government must show the defendant’s heroin was the 
proximate cause of the user’s death.35 Proximate cause is defined in 
this context as “a cause of death that played a substantial part in 
bringing about the death . . . meaning the death must have been either 
a direct result of or a reasonably probable consequence of the cause 
and except for the cause the death would not have occurred.”36 The 
district court denied the motion and instructed the jury that the 
Government only had to prove the heroin was a contributing cause of 
                                                 
28 Id. Notably, the “substantial” fines range from $1 million to $50 million, 
depending on the drug. 18 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
29 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). 
30 571 U.S. 204, 208 (2014). 
31 Id. at 205. 
32 Id. at 204. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 206. 
35 Id. at 207. 
36 Id. at 208. 
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the victim’s death.37 After the defendant was convicted, the court was 
required to apply the sentencing enhancement.38 The Eighth Circuit 
found the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion 
for a judgment of acquittal.39 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and ultimately reaffirmed that “when a crime requires not merely 
conduct but also a specified result of conduct, a defendant generally 
may not be convicted unless his conduct is both (1) the actual cause, 
and (2) the “legal cause (often called the “proximate cause”) of the 
result.”40 However, Congress may abrogate this principle by “speaking 
directly to the question.”41 The Court interpreted the phrase “results 
from” in § 841(b) as requiring but-for causation—that the death would 
not have occurred but for the defendant’s drug dealing—rather than 
proximate causation.42 Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s decision.43 
 Proximate cause is not easily defined; “it is a flexible concept.”44 
To say one event proximately caused another is a way of making two 
separate but related assertions.45 First, it means “the former event 
caused the latter.”46 This is known as actual cause or cause in fact.47 
Events have many causes; however, only some of them are 
                                                 
37 Id. at 207. 
38 Id. at 208. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 210. 
41 Id. at 216. 
42 Id. at 208. 
43 Id. The Government expressed concerns that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the “death results” enhancement would “unduly limit criminal 
responsibility”. However, the Court disagreed, stating “we doubt that the 
requirement of but-for causation for this incremental punishment will prove a policy 
disaster.” Id. at 216-17. 
44 Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (quoting Bridge v. 
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 533 U.S. 639, 654 (2008)).   
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proximate.48 To say that one event was a proximate cause of another 
means “it was not just any cause, but one with a sufficient connection 
to the result.”49 Proximate cause is often explained in terms of 
foreseeability.50 A requirement of proximate cause precludes liability 
in situations where “the causal link between conduct and the result is 
so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described as mere 
fortuity.”51 The Supreme Court has “found a proximate-cause 
requirement built into a statute that did not expressly impose one.”52 
 In United States v. Alvardo, the Fourth Circuit considered 
whether Congress intended for § 841(b)(1) to include proximate 
cause.53 In Alvardo, the defendant was convicted of knowingly and 
intentionally distributing heroin, resulting in death.54 On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the district court failed to instruct the jury that 
he must have “reasonably foreseen” that death could result.55 The 
district court gave the following jury instruction: 
 
If you find that the Government has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or 
intentionally distributed a mixture or substance 
containing a detectable amount of heroin on or about 
March 29, 2011, you must then determine whether the 
Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
death resulted from the use of such substance.56  
 
 The defendant relied on Staples v. United States, where the 
Supreme Court held “offenses that require no mens rea generally are 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 445. 
51 Id. (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838-39 (1996)). 
52 Paroline, 572 U.S. at 446. 
53 816 F.3d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016). 
54 Id. at 246. 
55 Id. at 244. 
56 Id. at 246. 
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disfavored.”57 The court broke § 841(b)(1)(C) down into two 
elements: (1) knowing or intentional distribution and (2) death caused 
by the use of that drug.58 The court found the first element, knowing or 
intentional distribution of heroin, included mens rea.59 The 
defendant’s reliance on Staples was misplaced however, because the 
court found Staples did not require every element of an offense to have 
a mens rea.60 Instead, Staples directed courts to “think twice before 
concluding that an offense, viewed as a whole, contains no mens rea 
requirement.”61 Therefore, § 841(b)(1)(C) did not support having a 
separate mens rea, but rather served to elevate the crime of knowingly 
or intentionally distributing heroin to a more serious level.62 The 
absence of a separate mens rea meant but-for cause was appropriate.63 
 The Tenth Circuit has also held that the “death results” 
enhancement only requires proof of but-for causation.64 In United 
States v. Burkholder, a district court declined to instruct the jury that 
the Government was required to prove an individual’s death was a 
reasonably foreseeable result of the charged drug distribution.65 The 
defendant was subsequently convicted.66 On appeal, the defendant 
argued that § 841(b)(1) required proof that the substance he distributed 
proximately caused the user’s death: that the death was a reasonably 
foreseeable result of his distribution.67 The defendant was a recovering 
addict and he was prescribed an opioid as part of his treatment.68 At 
the time he was prescribed the drug, the defendant signed an 
                                                 
57 Id. at 249 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)). 






64 816 F.3d 607, 609 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied (2017). 
65 Id. at 610. 
66 Id. at 609. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 610. 
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agreement with his doctor to not “sell, share or give any [amount] to 
another person.”69 The defendant was informed that taking the drug 
with other drugs, including alcohol, could be dangerous.70 Still, the 
defendant gave one of his pills to a friend, who ultimately ingested the 
pill and died as a result.71 The Tenth Circuit reached its holding after 
declaring the case an issue of statutory interpretation, inquiring 
whether the “death results” enhancement requires proof of proximate 
cause.72 Like its sister circuits, the Tenth Circuit looked to the plain 
language of § 841(b)(1), specifically Congress’s choice of the words 
“death ... results from the use of such substance.”73 In addition to the 
plain language, the court focused on the context in which the language 
was used and surveyed other federal statutes, identifying “numerous 
instances in which Congress explicitly included proximate-cause 
language in statutory penalty enhancements.”74 The court agreed with 
the defendant that proximate cause “inject[s] a foreseeability element 
into a statute”; however, it found Congress intended to omit a 
proximate cause requirement for the “death results” enhancement.75 
Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s jury 
instruction.76 




72 Id. at 611. 
73 Id. at 614. (emphasis in original). See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 
945, 948 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Beyond that minimum causation . . . it is not clear what 
‘results from’ might mean.”). 
74 Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 615. See also Camacho v. L.C. Ward, No. 15-CV 
388-JDP, 2016 WL 10679358, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2016) (Petitioner argued 
that the district court violated Burrage by unconstitutionally applying a sentencing 
enhancement by “considering the victim’s death a ‘foreseeable’ event of the 
petitioner and his associates’ joint criminal activity.” However, the Western District 
of Wisconsin determined the “foreseeability” element was unrelated to Burrage, and 
the petitioner did not identify any other statutory interpretation case that would 
retroactively apply to the issue). 
75 Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 613. 
76 Id. at 621. Unlike the majority, the dissent was not convinced that the 
10
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B.  Treating the enhancement as an element of the offense, rather than 
as a sentencing factor, heightens the burden of proof, benefitting the 
defense. 
 
 The higher the burden of proof, the more and stronger evidence 
the Government must present to meet its burden. In United States v. 
Booker, the Supreme Court held Federal Sentencing Guidelines are 
subject to jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment.77 For 
instance, in Booker, the defendant was convicted in the Western 
District of Wisconsin of possession with intent to distribute at least 40 
grams of cocaine base.78 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
defendant faced a sentence of 210 to 262 months in prison.79 At the 
sentencing hearing, the judge found additional facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which resulted in a mandatory 
sentence between 360 months and life.80 The judge treated the 
additional facts as sentencing factors, ultimately imposing a thirty-year 
sentence.81 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the defendant’s 
sentence conflicted with Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held a fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
                                                                                                                   
“results from” language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) “unambiguously reveals 
Congress’s intent to ‘forgo a proximate-cause requirement’ and impose strict 
liability on criminal defendants.” Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 621 (Briscoe, J., 
dissenting). The dissent expressed its concern that the majority’s holding was 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id. See also United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (holding “strict-liability criminal offenses 
are generally disfavored and . . . far more than the simple omission of the appropriate 
phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent 
requirement.”). 
77 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
78 Id. at 227. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 221. 
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doubt.82 The “statutory maximum” identified in Apprendi referred to 
the maximum sentence a judge could impose based “solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.”83 
 The Seventh Circuit applies the Supreme Court’s analysis to each 
element of the “death results” enhancement, requiring a jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed a drug 
offense and death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the 
drug. In United States v. Lawler, the defendant was convicted of 
distributing heroin and conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to 
distribute.84 The case went to the Supreme Court, which affirmed in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded in light of Alleyne v. United 
States.85 The defendant’s sentence was reduced, but he again appealed 
to the Seventh Circuit, challenging his sentence.86 The defendant was 
charged with thirty other defendants in a single-count indictment 
alleging a large-scale heroin distribution conspiracy, which 
contributed to five overdose deaths.87 The defendant was considered a 
“low-level member of the conspiracy.”88 While the indictment, to 
which the defendant pled guilty, did reference the overdoses, the 
Government did not prove that any particular defendant was 
responsible for any particular death.89 Relying on Alleyne, the Seventh 
Circuit held that an element of the “death results” enhancement should 
be treated as part of the offense, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.90  
                                                 
82 Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
83 Booker, 543 U.S. at 221. 
84 818 F.3d 281, 282 (7th Cir. 2016). 
85 Id. (citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (holding facts 
that increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt)). 
86 Lawler, 818 F.3d at 282. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 283. 
90 Id. at 284. 
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 “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is a significantly higher burden of 
proof than “preponderance of the evidence”; a higher burden favors 
the defense.91 By treating the sentencing enhancement as an element 
of the offense, rather than as a sentencing factor, the defendant can 
rely on the Government’s failure to meet its burden as a defense to the 
imposition of a sentence. The higher burden therefore offsets the fact 
that the Government is not required to prove proximate cause, tipping 
the scales from being largely in the Government’s favor to a more 
balanced analysis. 
 
THE NEED FOR DISCRETIONARY DEPARTURE STEMS FROM SENTENCING 
DISPARITIES FOR CASES WITH SIMILAR FACT PATTERNS 
 
 There are cases where the “death results” enhancement clearly 
should apply, whether or not death was foreseeable. However, there 
are also cases where a twenty-year sentence would be a miscarriage of 
justice. In addition, the fact that foreseeability is crucial to sentencing 
in drug conspiracy cases, yet not required for simple drug distribution, 
results in significant sentencing discrepancies between similar fact 
patterns. 
 
A.  Cases where the “death results” enhancement should apply, 
whether or not death was foreseeable.  
 
 Whether a sentence is a miscarriage of justice should be 
determined by separating unlawful conduct from otherwise innocent 
conduct.92 In Prevatte v. Merlak, the petitioner was convicted for 
detonating a pipe bomb that destroyed property and resulted in the 
death of an innocent bystander.93 If the pipe bomb had not caused a 
death, the maximum sentence the petitioner could have received was 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 United States v. McDuffy, 890 F.3d 796, 799-800 (2018) (citing Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)). 
93 865 F.3d 894, 895 (2017). 
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ten years.94 However, because the judge found that the bomb did cause 
the victim’s death, the petitioner was sentenced to forty-four years’ 
imprisonment on that count.95 The petitioner filed a writ for habeas 
corpus relief claiming that under Burrage, the jury, and not the judge, 
should have made the finding that the bomb was the but-for cause of 
the victim’s death.96 The district court dismissed the petitioner’s claim 
for lack of jurisdiction and he appealed.97 The Seventh Circuit agreed 
that the petition should be dismissed, but also found the evidence as to 
causation was unrebutted at trial. Thus, the petitioner’s enhanced 
sentence was neither illegal nor a miscarriage of justice.98 
 In United States v. McDuffy, the defendant, charged with bank 
robbery, moved for the district court to recognize a specific intent 
mens rea requirement after the court sought to impose a “death 
results” enhancement.99 The district court denied this request.100 The 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for a 
bank robbery resulting in death.101 Similar to the “death results” 
enhancement for drug offenses, a defendant faces a mandatory 
minimum sentence if death results from a bank robbery.102 Here, the 
Ninth Circuit held the only mens rea requirement for the sentencing 
enhancement was the mens rea necessary to commit the underlying 
bank robbery.103 Therefore, in McDuffy’s case, the enhancement 
applied even if the death was an accident.104 Similar to § 841(b)(1)(C), 
this statutory provision105 did not contain an explicit mens rea 










103 Id. at 800. 
104 Id. 
105 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
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requirement.106 Still, the defendant urged the district court to read the 
requirement into the statute.107 The Ninth Circuit looked to Staples v. 
United States and determined courts must read a mens rea requirement 
into a statute only when it “is necessary to separate wrongful conduct 
from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”108 In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned, “it is unusual to impose criminal punishment for the 
consequences of purely accidental conduct.109 But it is not unusual to 
punish individuals for the unintended consequences of their unlawful 
acts.”110 
 When the defendant is responsible for directly distributing drugs 
that result in death, there is little question that the “death results” 
enhancement does and should apply.111 Courts have been less 
confident in their decision to apply the “death results” enhancement to 
defendants higher up in the drug distribution chain because 
foreseeability of a specific user’s death appears less and less likely.112  
 
B.  Cases where a 20-year mandatory minimum is a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
 Sometimes, the defendant is not the cliché: not the typical “bad 
guy” you see in movies. Sometimes, the defendant and the drug-user 
had a positive, healthy relationship; they were friends or married. In 
the midst of grieving, these defendants are forced to face the reality 
that life as they know it is about to change—they face decades in 
prison. In Krieger v. United States, the defendant was convicted for 
                                                 
106 McDuffy, 890 F.3d at 801. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 799-800 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)). 
109 McDuffy, 890 F.3d at 799-800. 
110 Id.; United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding the 
Government, in a drug conspiracy case, did not have to prove the defendant intended 
to create a substantial risk of harm, warranting a higher sentence, when the defendant 
reached for his gun during flight). 
111 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2013), rehearing en 
banc denied (Aug. 23, 2013). 
112 Id. 
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distribution of fentanyl.113 The defendant received a twenty-year 
sentence because her friend died after chewing a fentanyl patch 
provided by the defendant.114 During sentencing, the defendant 
objected to the manner in which the Government sought the “death 
results” sentencing enhancement.115 The Government argued it was a 
sentencing factor, which must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, rather than an element, which must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.116 After finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that death resulted from the fentanyl, the court concluded it was 
obligated to impose the mandatory minimum sentence.117 The district 
court expressed “discomfort with its lack of discretion and the fact that 
it appeared that [the defendant] was being sentenced for homicide 
despite having been convicted only of distributing fentanyl.”118 
Notably, without the enhancement, the maximum penalty for 
distributing small amounts of fentanyl would have been twenty years, 
with no minimum penalty.119 The defendant’s presentence 
investigative report recommended a sentencing range of ten to sixteen 
months, which is significantly shorter than the twenty-year mandatory 
minimum imposed by the “death results” enhancement.120 
 Between the time of the defendant’s sentencing and appeal, the 
Supreme Court issued several decisions that touched on the issues 
Krieger raised.121 In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that facts that 
                                                 





118 Id. at 495. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. (“The average length of incarceration for defendants convicted under 21 
U.S.C. § 841 for distribution of fentanyl where death has not resulted was seven 
months”). Id. 
121 Id. at 496. In collateral review, the Seventh Circuit heard arguments as to 
whether the Government had sufficient evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that “death resulted”. The district court was persuaded that the 
Government proved this element by a preponderance of the evidence, but believed 
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increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.122 Therefore, if the defendant 
in Krieger were to be sentenced post-Alleyne, she could not receive the 
“death results” enhancement unless the indictment charged, and the 
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt, that the fentanyl caused her 
friend’s death.123 Then, in Burrage, the Court held a defendant cannot 
receive the “death results” enhancement unless the drug the defendant 
distributed was a but-for cause of death.124 
 In evaluating the Krieger appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted the 
“murkiness of causation”.125 It went on to apply the Supreme Court 
decisions in Alleyne and Burrage, determining the Government was 
required to show that the fentanyl patch, which Krieger provided, was 
the but-for cause of her friend’s death.126 Krieger’s sentence was 
thereafter vacated and remanded to the district court for 
resentencing.127 The district court judge expressed his discomfort with 
imposing a twenty year sentence, stating the sentence was “one of the 
most difficult decisions [he has] had to make, and it’s a decision that 
[he did] not agree with . . . in [his] opinion, 20 years [wa]s too 
harsh.”128 
 Another area of concern is ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
imposition of a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence is unjust if 
the defendant’s defense attorney does not effectively challenge its 
application or hold the Government to its burden. For example, in 
Gaylord v. United States, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute and distribution of oxycodone.129 A drug user ingested pills 
                                                                                                                   
the Government could not have proven “death resulted” beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2010). 
122 Krieger, 842 F.3d at 496. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 501. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 505. 
128 Krieger, 628 F.3d at 862. 
129 829 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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distributed by the defendant, as well as cocaine from another source, 
and died.130 The defendant was sentenced to twenty years based on the 
“death results” enhancement.131 The defendant later brought a 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion132 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, 
arguing that as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the “death 
results” enhancement was inappropriately applied to his case.133 
Specifically, the defense attorney did not contend that the Government 
failed to prove the oxycodone was the but-for cause of the drug user’s 
death.134 Approximately two years after the defendant was sentenced, 
the Supreme Court held that but-for causation must be shown for the 
“death results” enhancement to apply.135 In this defendant’s case, there 
was no evidence that the oxycodone the defendant distributed was the 
but-for cause of death.136 As a result, the Seventh Circuit vacated the 
district court’s judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing on the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.137 
 Another area of concern is when a drug user intends to overdose 
because a drug user’s intentions are irrelevant in an analysis of the 
drug dealer’s liability. In Perrone v. United States, the defendant 
moved to alter or vacate his sentence for unlawful drug distribution, 
challenging the district court’s application of the “death results” 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 This motion is filed when the defendant believes his or her sentence was 
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or when the 
defendant believes his or her sentence is more than the maximum penalty authorized 
by law. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
133 Gaylord, 829 F.3d at 504. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 507. 
137 Id. at 509. See Linder v. Kreuger, No. 1:15-CV-01055-SLD, 2017 WL  
1102740, at *4 (C.D. Ill. March 23, 2017) (“Misapplication of the law raising a 
statutory minimum either from zero to twenty years . . . would constitute a 
‘miscarriage of justice’ sufficient to warrant relief via habeas corpus.”). 
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sentencing enhancement.138 In Perrone, the victim died after the 
defendant injected her with 7.5 grams of cocaine, part of a suicide pact 
gone wrong.139 The defendant pled guilty to a single count of unlawful 
drug distribution and stipulated that his distribution caused the 
victim’s death.140 On appeal, he claimed that if he knew the 
enhancement required the Government to show his cocaine was the 
but-for cause of the user’s death, he would have sought to withdraw 
his plea.141 The day before the defendant was sentenced, the Seventh 
Circuit decided United States v. Hatfield, which held the “death 
results” enhancement requires the Government prove the ingestion of 
the defendant’s drugs was a but-for cause of the death.142 The Seventh 
Circuit also looked to Davis v. United States, which held that “when a 
subsequent statutory interpretation narrows the elements of a crime, 
revealing that the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced for ‘an 
act that the law does not make criminal,’ the petitioner has suffered ‘a 
complete miscarriage of justice,’ that justifies relief under § 2255.”143 
The Seventh Circuit concluded the defendant asserted a cognizable 
claim under § 2255; however, the evidence before the court did not 
suggest the defendant’s sentence was increased by the application of 
an enhancement of which he was “actually innocent”.144 Therefore, he 
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. 145 
 Like the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Perrone, the Ninth Circuit 
has ruled a defendant can be held responsible for a death that is an 
unforeseeable suicide. In United States v. Houston, the Ninth Circuit 
held: (1) the government need not prove it was foreseeable that the 
                                                 
138 899 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2018). 
139 Id. at 900. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 901. 
142 Id. at 902 (citing United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 
2010)). 
143Perrone, 899 F.3d at 904 (citing Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-
47 (1974)). 
144 Perrone, 899 F.3d at 904. 
145 Id. 
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recipient of methadone might suffer death or serious bodily injury in 
order for the court to impose the “death results” enhancement; and (2) 
the district court’s error in instructing the jury that proximate cause 
was necessary to impose the sentencing enhancement was harmless.146 
On appeal, the defendant argued she was being held responsible for a 
death that was an unforeseeable suicide.147 Essentially, the defendant 
advocated for proximate cause. The user was found dead in her home 
with numerous controlled substances in her blood and urine.148 The 
defendant’s name was on a prescription bottle found at the scene.149 
The Ninth Circuit determined that there were some crimes where 
proving proximate cause was unnecessary because foreseeability was 
“implicit in the common understanding of the crime.”150 These crimes 
include, but are not limited to, involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy to 
assault, and drug conspiracy.151 However, this understanding did not 
apply to the charge at issue: drug distribution.152 Despite 
acknowledging the inconsistent decision to require foreseeability in 
some, but not all, drug cases, the Ninth Circuit agreed with its sister 
circuits that the plain language of the “death results” enhancement did 
not require proximate cause.153 It also placed weight on the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Patterson, which observed that: 
“The statute puts drug dealers and users on clear notice that their 
sentences will be enhanced if people die from using the drugs they 
distribute.”154 As to the defendant’s argument regarding the incorrect 
jury instruction, the Ninth Circuit determined it “inured to the benefit 
                                                 
146 406 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005). 
147 Id. at 1122. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 




154 Id. at 1124 (citing United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145-46 (4th Cir. 
1994)). 
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of the defendant because it placed a higher burden of proof on the 
Government than [was] required by law.”155 
 The application of the “death results” enhancement is not 
contingent upon the quantity of drugs distributed or manufactured, 
meaning the defendants receiving the enhancement are not necessarily 
large-scale distributors. This dilemma appeared in United States v. 
Rebmann, where the Sixth Circuit considered whether “the 
Government may convert a defendant’s plea of guilty to only the 
distribution of 1/1000th of an ounce of heroin into a homicide case by 
asserting that the defendant’s husband died from an overdose of heroin 
she sent him.”156 The Sixth Circuit concluded the district court was 
correct in rejecting the Government’s motion for the “death results” 
enhancement.157 Notably, its rationale was not based on causation, but 
on the burden of proof.158 The court held the Government was required 
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the death of an individual, to 
whom the defendant distributed heroin, was a result of the 
distribution.159 The Sixth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s recent 
ruling in Apprendi, and determined the “death results” provisions were 
more than “a mere sentencing factor.”160 Because the district court 
applied the sentencing enhancement to the defendant in this case based 
solely on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that death 
resulted from the crime, the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and 
remanded the case for a determination that the death was caused by the 
                                                 
155 Houston, 406 F.3d at 1125. 
156 321 F.3d 540, 541 (6th Cir. 2003). On appeal, the Government argued that  
even if it was unsuccessful in bringing the mandatory-minimum through the “death 
results” enhancement, it could use the fact that death resulted as the basis for an 
“enhancement for relevant conduct”, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § D1.1, which can still 
lead to a twenty-year sentence. The court rejected the Government’s ability to 
circumvent its burden by this nature. Id. at 543. 
157 Id. at 544. 
158 Id. at 545. 
159 Id. at 541. 
160 Id. 
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distribution of heroin beyond a reasonable doubt.161 Thus, Rebmann 
represents an occasion where a defendant was first “sentence[d] for a 
homicide under the guise of a guilty plea to the distribution of a very 
small quantity of drugs.”162  
 If one makes the argument that death is always a foreseeable 
result of illegal drug distribution, then “not only would the individual 
who produced the [drug] receive the twenty-year sentence, but every 
person connected with the conspiracy in any way—from the lowliest 
lookout on the corner to the boss—would all receive the same twenty-
year penalty.”163 This result is overly broad. At the same time, strict 
liability makes sure that “a kingpin who finances and controls a drug 
distribution operation cannot escape liability for the ‘death resulting’ 
penalty simply because he never personally sold to costumers.”164 
 Think of it this way: 21 U.S.C. § 841 makes it illegal to 
“distribute” but not “share” heroin.165 If two friends are physically 
together when they buy and use heroin for their personal use, there is 
arguably no distribution.166 If one of the two friends dies from an 
overdose, the other friend is not accountable for the death under the 
plain language of § 841.167 However, the Government could prosecute 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 545; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (holding it is 
doubtful that Congress would have intended such a steep sentencing enhancement to 
be contingent on judicial fact-finding); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 554 
(2002) (holding a fact that steeply alters the defendant’s punishment is “not usually 
associated with sentencing factors.”). 
163 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 837 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Lawler v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2287, 189 L. Ed. 2d 
169 (2014). 
164 Walker, 721 F.3d at 839. 
165 Katherine Daniels and Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and 
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the person who sold them the drugs and then the court would be 
required to apply the “death results” enhancement.168 
 
C.  The Government may be required to prove foreseeability when a 
sentencing enhancement is applied in drug conspiracy cases. This 
application is inconsistent with simple drug distribution cases. 
 
 Foreseeability is heavily litigated in the context of drug 
conspiracy sentencing; however, courts have found these arguments 
have no place in their analysis for simple distribution cases. The 
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Patterson, refused to analogize case 
law from drug conspiracy cases, in which the defendants contested 
application of the “death results” enhancement, to simple distribution 
cases because in simple distribution cases the court is only concerned 
with the individual defendant’s conduct.169 In Patterson, the 
defendants had hoped to apply the foreseeability requirement to their 
simple distribution case.170 The defendants pled guilty to unlawful 
distribution of morphine sulfate and meperidine, which resulted in an 
individual’s death, and to aiding and abetting that offense.171 The 
Fourth Circuit held the evidence supported the “death results” 
sentencing enhancement.172 A defendant brought controlled substances 
to a party and traded several pills in exchange for a tattoo.173 At some 
point in the night, the host of the party discussed her intentions to take 
drugs.174 The defendant subsequently left to obtain syringes from his 
home.175 Upon his return, the host told the defendant that another 
                                                 
168 Id. There is also a risk that a sentencing enhancement constitutes a 
constructive amendment of the indictment when the court instructs the jury on the 
death results provision without such offense being set forth in the indictment. United 
States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 309 (4th Cir. 2012). 
169 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 142. 
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guest was giving the host the defendant’s pills all night.176 Still, the 
defendant, host and others injected morphine, which the defendant 
melted down.177 When the friends woke up the next morning, they 
found the host dead.178 The facts of this case supported simple 
distribution, not a conspiracy, and established that the defendant’s 
actions directly contributed to the host’s death.179 Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit refused to analogize a foreseeability requirement in drug 
conspiracy cases to simple distribution cases, making the defendant’s 
case law irrelevant.180 
 The Third Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Robinson parallels 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Harden. At the defendant’s 
sentencing hearing, the district court found that “based on their 
previous drug dealings, it was reasonably foreseeable to [the] 
defendant that [a co-conspirator] would deliver drugs to others.”181 
The court also found: 1) the delivery of the heroin by the co-
conspirator to drug users was in furtherance of a conspiracy in which 
the defendant was a member; and 2) the delivery was reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant in connection with the criminal activity he 
agreed to undertake.182 The Third Circuit looked to the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Patterson, which relied on the 
plain language of  § 841(b)(1) to determine the enhancement has no 
reasonable foreseeability of death requirement.183 The Third Circuit 
agreed that the court should give effect to Congress’s intent.184 
Therefore, because Congress’ language was plain and unambiguous, 
the court applied the statute as written.185 The record was clear; it was 





180 Id. at 145-6. 
181 167 F.3d 824, 828 (3d Cir. 1999). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 830 (citing United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
184 Robinson, 167 F.3d at 830. 
185 Id. at 830-31. 
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reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s co-conspirator would 
distribute the drugs to a third-party.186 This was not only reasonably 
foreseeable, but “it was the very purpose of the conspiracy.”187 Thus, 
the defendant was subject to the minimum twenty-year sentence.188 
 The First Circuit, in United States v. Soler, emphasized that the 
charge and the nature of the defendant’s conduct within a conspiracy 
shapes whether the Government has to prove death was reasonably 
foreseeable to a particular defendant.189 In Soler, the defendant argued 
the “death results” enhancement was inapplicable because the key 
event leading to the death—the drug user snorting heroin under the 
misimpression that it was cocaine—was not reasonably foreseeable, 
and that the death itself could not be foreseeable.190 Like in Robinson, 
the First Circuit placed weight on the fact that the statute did not speak 
to the defendant’s state of mind, which undercut the defendant’s 
argument that the court should impose a foreseeability test.191 While 
the defendant cited several cases that imposed a reasonable 
foreseeability requirement, those cases involved liability of one co-
conspirator for the acts of others.192 In contrast, “When a defendant’s 
own conduct has caused the harm, those cases are inapposite” and 
strict liability applies.193 Therefore, because the defendant was not 
charged in a drug conspiracy, and in turn, did not argue that he was 
being sentenced based on a co-conspirator’s conduct, conspiracy case 
law supporting the foreseeability of death requirement was inapposite. 
                                                 
186 Id. at 831. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 832. The defendant cited U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3), which the court 
determined was consistent with its result. The section includes as relevant conduct a 
“jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . whether charged as a conspiracy, all 
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity.” Id. 
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 Even when courts do comment on whether a drug user’s death 
was reasonably foreseeable to a particular defendant, the question 
before the court is whether the distribution of drugs was foreseeable, 
not whether the death was foreseeable. In United States v. Swiney, two 
members of a heroin conspiracy appealed the application of the 
mandatory minimum sentence to their convictions.194 The Government 
filed a cross-appeal, arguing that all of the defendants should have 
received at least twenty years because death resulted from the use of 
heroin that was distributed by members of their  conspiracy.195 The 
district court found no proof linking these defendants to the death, 
using a “critical proximate cause inquiry.”196 On appeal, the 
Government argued that all of the defendants should be held 
accountable for the death under the Pinkerton theory of vicarious 
liability.197 The Sixth Circuit rejected the Government’s theory of 
accountability “because the scope of conduct for which a defendant 
can be held accountable under the Sentencing Guidelines is narrower 
than the conduct encompassed by conspiracy law.”198 The court 
concluded, “In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a 
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the 
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a 
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred 
during the commission of the offense of conviction” shall be 
considered during sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B).199 Thus, before any of the defendants in Swiney could 
be subject to the sentence enhancement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), the 
district court had to find that he or she was part of the distribution 
chain that led to a user’s death and that a conspiracy member’s 
distribution of heroin was “reasonably foreseeable” to other members 
                                                 
194 203 F.3d 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2000). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946)). 
198 Swiney, 203 F.3d at 399. 
199 Id. at 402 (emphasis added). 
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of the conspiracy, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).200 The 
foreseeability requirement, while required for the sentencing 
enhancement, was still connected to the drug distribution rather than 
foreseeability of death.201 
 The defendant in United States v. McIntosh argued the Eighth 
Circuit should apply the reasoning in Swiney to his case.202 The court 
refused, finding Swiney is only applicable to cases where a conspiracy 
defendant played no direct part in manufacturing the drug or in 
immediately distributing the drug that caused the death or serious 
bodily injury.203 Instead, the court quoted the Third Circuit’s holding 
in United States v. Robinson, which stated “the risk is inherent in 
distributing [a controlled substance] and thus, [Congress] provided 
that persons who distribute it do so at their peril.”204 McIntosh was 
therefore subject to the enhancement based on his direct role in 
manufacturing the drug ingested by the user.205 
 In 2013, the Seventh Circuit heard as a matter of first impression 
arguments as to whether a district court has to make specific factual 
findings determining whether each defendant’s conduct was part of the 
distribution chain that caused a user’s death.206 United States v. Walker 
concerned the overdose deaths of five individuals who died after using 
heroin distributed by a large-scale drug trafficking organization.207 
                                                 
200 Id. at 406. 
201 Id. 
202 236 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2001). 
203 Id. See United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 567 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The  
question whether the actions of others were reasonably foreseeable to the particular 
defendants . . . is a factual one. Those facts will exist in some hub-and-spokes style 
conspiracies, especially when the culpability of individuals near the hub is at stake. 
They are the people who can predict what their counterparts are doing, even if they 
have no direct knowledge”). 
204 McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 972 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 
824, 831 (3rd Cir. 1999)). 
205 McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 974. 
206 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2013), rehearing en 
banc denied (Aug. 23, 2013). 
207 Id. 
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The defendants in Walker pled guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute and conspiracy to distribute heroin.208 The district court 
interpreted § 841 as requiring a twenty-year mandatory minimum 
sentence for all members of the conspiracy because the drug 
organization as a whole caused the deaths of several customers, 
essentially concluding the defendants should be held strictly liable.209 
On appeal, the defendants argued this was an error, and the Seventh 
Circuit agreed, holding “a defendant can only be subject to the 
enhancement if the distribution of heroin that ultimately led to a 
victim’s death was ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”210 There is unanimity 
across the circuits that a defendant involved in a drug conspiracy 
should only be sentenced for conduct foreseeable to him—the trouble 
is, defendants like Donald Harden believe the result of their conduct 
should also have to be foreseeable in order for the sentencing 
enhancement to apply. 
 
UNITED STATES V. HARDEN WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED 
 
 In the morning of September 5, 2014, Fred Schnettler was found 
dead in his bedroom at his parents’ home.211 Upon arrival, officers 
observed a needle and spoon on the floor.212 Donald Harden was later 
charged with distributing the heroin that resulted in Schnettler’s 
death.213 At trial, the Government argued Schnettler purchased 0.1 
                                                 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 833. 
210 Id. at 835; United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (in a  
matter of first impression, the D.C. Circuit held district courts must make an 
individualized finding as to quantity of drugs foreseeable to an individual defendant 
before applying a mandatory minimum sentence). See also United States v. Haines, 
803 F.3d 713, 741 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding a defendant may be subject to a 
mandatory minimum sentence based on the quantity of drugs he distributed as well 
as the quantity distributed conspiracy-wide if the quantity was reasonably 
foreseeable).  
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grams of heroin from Kyle Peterson the night before he died.214 
Peterson testified that he purchased the heroin from Brandi Kniebes-
Larsen, who in turn testified she received the heroin from Harden.215 
The Government presented a timeline to establish that Harden’s heroin 
reached Schnettler between 7:30 p.m. and 8 p.m. on September 4, 
2014.216 The Government argued Schnettler overdosed on the heroin 
shortly after 10 p.m.; the defense presented a conflicting timeline.217 
Kniebes-Larsen, who testified as a cooperating witness, provided 
crucial testimony regarding whether Harden was aware of the quality, 
and danger of, the heroin he distributed.218 On direct-examination, 
Kniebes-Larsen testified that when she purchased the heroin, Harden 
told her she “needed to be very careful because apparently there were 
bodies on this heroin.”219 
 Furthermore, at the end of the trial, the jury received two special 
verdict questions: (1) whether the United States has established, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Frederick Schnettler died as a result of 
the use of a controlled substance; and (2) whether the conspiracy 
involved 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing 
heroin.220 With respect to the first special verdict question, the jury 
instruction said:  
 
                                                 
214 Id. at 440-41. 




219 Id. While the credibility of witnesses is important to every criminal 
prosecution, it is especially taxing in cases involving drug overdose deaths because 
the key witnesses tend to either be addicts themselves or have prior convictions. 
Katherine Daniels and Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and Prosecuting 
Heroin Overdose Cases, 41 CRIM. LAW. LAW BULLETIN 5 (2005). In Harden, the 
court found that Kniebes-Larsen was credible and ultimately relied on her testimony 
to suggest Schnettler’s death was foreseeable to Harden, despite Kniebes-Larsen 
being a heroin addict. Harden, 893 F.3d at 443-44. 
220 Id. 
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The United States does not have the burden of 
establishing that the defendant intended that death 
resulted from the distribution or the use of the 
controlled substance. Nor does the United States have 
the burden of establishing that the defendant knew, or 
should have known, that death would result from the 
distribution of the controlled substance by the 
defendant.221 
 
 The jury convicted Harden of conspiracy to distribute 100 grams 
or more of heroin, resulting in death, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846.222 The court applied the “death 
results” enhancement, and Harden was sentenced to life in prison.223 
 The sentencing enhancement required that the Government prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Harden conspired to distribute 100 
grams or more of heroin; and (2) death or serious bodily injury 
resulted from the use of the heroin.224 On appeal, Harden did not 
dispute that the Government presented sufficient evidence to prove the 
first element.225 However, Harden did contest the sufficiency of the 
evidence as to the second element.226 Harden’s sufficiency claim 
                                                 
221 Id. (emphasis added). At the end of Harden’s trial, the district court judge 
inquired into whether either party had any objections to the jury instructions or the 
verdict forms. Id. On the Government’s recommendation, the court adjusted the 
verdict form to tie the death of Mr. Schnettler to Harden. Id. The form read as 
follows: “Did the death of Frederick Schnettler result from the use of heroin 
provided by the Defendant, Donald S. Harden?” Id. Aside from this adjustment, 
neither party requested any additional instructions. Id. Thus, Harden waived any 
challenge regarding jury instructions, including his later argument that the jury 
should have been instructed regarding foreseeability. Id. at 450. 
222 Id. at 445. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. The second element is derived from Burrage’s holding that the “death 
results” enhancement of § 841 is an element that must be submitted to the jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
225 Id. at 446. 
226 Id. 
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hinged on his interpretation of the “death results” language.227 Harden 
argued the “death results” language requires proximate-cause.228 This 
would require the Government show Schnettler’s death was a 
reasonably foreseeable result of Harden’s drug dealing.229 Every other 
circuit that has addressed this issue has held the “death results” 
enhancement does not require proximate cause, and therefore the 
government need not prove foreseeability.230 
 However, Harden argued that principles of co-conspirator liability 
compel a proximate cause requirement in this context.231 Harden relied 
on Pinkerton v. United States, where the Supreme Court held a 
defendant may only be found liable for a co-conspirator’s criminal act 
if it was reasonably foreseeable.232 The Seventh Circuit refused to 
apply this reasoning to Harden’s case because Harden did not claim he 
was sentenced based on a co-conspirator’s unforeseeable criminal 
act.233 Instead, he argued that the “consequence of his own criminal 
act—Schnettler’s death—was not reasonably foreseeable.”234 Thus, 
the issue presented did not implicate Pinkerton’s limitations. 235 
                                                 
227 Id. at 446-47. 
228 Id. at 447. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 447-48; United States v. Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607, 618 (10th Cir.  
2016); United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 137 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Houston, 406 
F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 284 (5h 
Cir. 2002); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Patterson, 38 
F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994).  
231 United States v. Harden, 893 F.3d 434, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). “Even the 
Government believed it bore that burden, alleging in the indictment that Schnettler’s 
death resulted from the use of heroin distributed by Harden and his co-conspirators, 
that was reasonably foreseeable to him.” Appellant’s Br. 28 (Oct. 19, 2017).  
232 Harden, 893 F.3d at 449. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. (emphasis in original). On appeal, defense counsel argued that  
“Schnettler’s death, which allegedly resulted from his taking 0.1 grams of heroin that 
another user described as ‘junk’, occurred after the heroin passed four links down the 
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 The Seventh Circuit also looked to the statutory language of the 
enhancement, which does not require proof of proximate cause.236 The 
sentencing enhancement is triggered if “death or serious bodily injury 
results from the use of such substance.”237 The use of the phrase 
“results from” is noteworthy because “resulting in death and causing 
death are not equivalents.”238 The Seventh Circuit identified numerous 
instances where Congress explicitly included the proximate cause 
language in sentencing enhancements.239 The court found that if 
Congress wanted to require proximate cause it would have explicitly 
done so.240 The court also considered the policy implications of its 
decision.241 “Due to the extremely hazardous nature of drug 
distribution, a policy of strict liability when death occurs fits the 
statutory language and its evident purpose.”242 By treating the 
enhancement as a matter of strict liability, the courts are de facto 
categorizing the death as foreseeable, regardless of whether a 
particular defendant foresaw or should have foreseen such a result.243 
 
POST-HARDEN: HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION WILL MAKE A 
LASTING IMPACT 
  
 Defendants appealing their sentences to the Seventh Circuit have 
begun citing Harden hoping the court will impose a foreseeability 
                                                                                                                   
causal chain from Harden was not reasonably foreseeable.” Appellant’s Br. 23 (Oct. 
19, 2017). 
235 Id. 
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requirement for the resulting death.244 At the same time, district courts 
are relying on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Harden to justify 
why the Government need not prove foreseeability.245 While statutory 
interpretation explains outright why Harden was correctly decided, the 
Supreme Court should consider hearing a case where the application 
of the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence is not easily 
rationalized. The occasional discomfort of district court judges, when 
imposing the “death results” enhancement without the option of 
exercising discretion, will likely result in a Supreme Court opinion 
suggesting a need for legislative reform. This is the only way district 
court judges will be able to depart from this mandatory minimum 
sentence.246 Clarity across the board will encourage prosecutors to ask 
for the sentencing enhancement, which will have a positive impact on 
the opioid crisis. 
 For example, in United States v. Shanks, the defendant relied on 
Harden to argue the “death results” enhancement could not apply 
because the death was not reasonably foreseeable.247 In Shanks, the 
defendant was charged with a variety of drug related offenses, 
including conspiracy to distribute and possessing with intent to 
distribute controlled substances, as well as knowingly distributing 
controlled substances, resulting in the deaths of two individuals, and 
serious bodily harm of another, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 
and (b)(1)(C).248 The defendant moved for an in camera inspection of 
psychological treatment records of one of the victims.249 He argued the 
records may contain exculpatory evidence, including evidence the 
victim died as a result of suicide, which he contended would release 
                                                 
244 See United States v. Shanks, No. 18-CR-18, 2018 WL 3439639, at *1 (E.D. 
Wis. July 17, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0018, 2018 
WL 4011569 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2018). 
245 Id. 
246 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are enacted and amended by Congress. 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Congress has the constitutional power to make laws. Id. The 
Supreme Court may only interpret them. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
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him of any liability for the user’s death.250 The Government argued 
that the “death results” enhancement is a strict liability offense.251 The 
district court found it was unclear how the user’s psychological 
records were material to his cause of death.252 Even if the user was 
suicidal at the time of his death, and the defendant could show the user 
intentionally took the drugs to commit suicide, that would not negate 
the but-for causation requirement.253 As to the defendant’s argument 
that the records would show the user’s death was unforeseeable, the 
court held “reasonable foreseeability is not required for the ‘death 
results’ enhancement.254 Stated differently, once the Government 
shows the ‘but for’ causal connection between the drug and the 
resulting death, criminal liability attaches without the need to prove 
foreseeability.”255 The court looked to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in 
Harden and concluded “strict liability creates an incentive for a drug 
dealer to warn his customer about the strength of a particular batch of 
drugs being sold and to refuse to supply drugs to a particularly 
vulnerable people.”256 
 The Seventh Circuit continues to recognize that strict liability has 
limits when applied to the “death results” enhancement. For example, 
on a conspiracy charge, “it is not sufficient for the Government to 
prove that a defendant participated in an overall conspiracy in which a 
drug user died.”257 The Government must prove a particular defendant 
responsible for a particular death.258 Essentially, the Government 
“need not prove that the death was reasonably foreseeable for the 
‘death results’ enhancement to apply in a case where a defendant 
directly distributes drugs or uses intermediaries to distribute drugs that 
                                                 




254 Id. at *3. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. (quoting United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
257 Shanks, 2018 WL 3439639, at *3. 
258 Id. 
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result in death.259 However, in a conspiracy [case], the Government 
must prove that the defendant’s relevant conduct encompasses the 
drugs linked to the death.”260 In Shanks, the defendant was not only 
charged as part of a conspiracy, but he also faced a substantive count 
of knowingly distributing drugs to the decedent.261 Therefore, the 
foreseeability requirement in the context of conspiracy need not apply, 
and the elements of the “death results” sentencing enhancement were 
proven on the basis of the substantive count.262 
 Recently, the Third Circuit has gone so far as to allow a jury 
instruction on proximate cause in a case involving a “death resulted” 
sentencing enhancement. In United States v. Gonzalez, the defendants 
were convicted of conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and 
cyberstalking, resulting in death.263 The defendants appealed to the 
Third Circuit, challenging the district court’s “death resulted” 
instruction, which was supplied to the jury to determine whether the 
defendants qualified for the sentencing enhancement.264 The 
Government argued that under the instructions there were two theories 
of liability: (1) the death resulted from the defendants’ personal 
actions if the defendant’s actions were the actual and proximate cause 
of the individual’s death; or (2) the defendants were responsible for 
the death under co-conspirator liability.265 The district court permitted 
the proximate cause theory, observing that its instruction held the jury 
to a higher standard than the law required.266 The court thought of it as 
a “necessary safeguard for the defendants’ rights”.267 Thus, on appeal, 
the Third Circuit determined that the district court did not err because 
the “actual cause” part of the instruction tracked but-for causation, and 
                                                 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at *1. 
262 Id. at *3. 
263 905 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2018). 
264 Id. at 179. 
265 Id. at 188. 
266 Id. at 190. 
267 Id. at 188. 
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the “proximate cause” part of the instruction provided an even more 
stringent finding than required.268  
 
A.  The Supreme Court should consider whether a discretionary 
departure is appropriate for the “death results” enhancement. 
  
 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines permit downward departures 
“from the prescribed sentencing range in cases in which the judge 
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
result in a sentence different from that described.”269 Still, departures 
are not available in every case, and “in fact are unavailable in 
most.”270 There is no case law to support the idea that 18 U.S.C. § 
3553 permits a judge to sentence below the mandatory minimum in 
the “death results” enhancement. In fact, court opinions where judges 
express their desire for discretion suggest the contrary. The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are set forth by Congress.271 Because it is 
unlikely that members of Congress will advocate on behalf of this 
discretionary departure, since it could be framed as convicted 
criminals serving less time, the Supreme Court will have to lead the 
charge. If the Supreme Court were to take issue with the district 
court’s lack of discretion, it can critique potential due process 
violations all it wants, but it must ultimately call for the legislature to 
amend § 841. 
 Congress’ goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the 
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.272 
Uniformity “does not consist simply of similar sentences for those 
convicted of violations of the same statute . . . It consists, more 
importantly, of similar relationships between sentences and real 
                                                 
268 Id. at 189. 
269 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-233). 
270 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005). 
271 Id. at 253. 
272 Id. 
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conduct, relationships that Congress’ sentencing statutes helped to 
advance.”273 
 Granting a district court judge discretion in a downward departure 
will not inhibit narcotics prosecutions and may in fact improve the 
opioid crisis. Courts will still be bound by the mandatory minimum 
sentence if death results from drug distribution or manufacturing. 
Prosecutors will not have to prove the death was foreseeable. A 
defendant whose case teeters on the line between accidental and 
criminal conduct will have an avenue to request relief. A defendant 
whose case warrants a twenty-year sentence will get one. A defendant 
whose case does not can be directed to addiction programs or assist 
law enforcement in pursuing his or her supplier. There is “growing and 
wholly justified” concern about the “proliferation and variety of drug 
crimes”, but perhaps the best way to reduce these crimes is to not feel 
settled in the status quo.274 
                                                 
273 Id. at 253-54. 
274 Id. at 235. 
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